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THE UTILITY OF DISCLOSURE AS A
REFORM TO THE PRETRIAL DISCOVERY
PROCESS
ANNE Y. SHIELDS*
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 ("CJRA") requires each
United States District Court to implement a civil justice expense
and delay reduction plan ("plan").' Plans are to be developed by a
court-appointed advisory group consisting of attorneys and lay
persons representing litigants within the district.2 While the
CJRA does not specify the exact content of the individual plans, it
sets forth guidelines to be considered when formulating them.'
One of the major targets of the CJRA's guidelines is the discovery process. 4 Specifically, the CJRA suggests changing the
pretrial process by controlling the extent of discovery and time allowed to complete it. In order to contain discovery costs, the CJRA
encourages the "voluntary exchange of information... through
5
the use of cooperative discovery devices."
This Article focuses on the concept of automatic disclosure of
information without the making of a formal request as one suggested method of containing the expense and delay of the discovery process. After reviewing statistical information indicating the
length of the typical discovery process as well as attorneys' and
judicial officers' attitudes towards the discovery process, the Article describes the "disclosure" process 6 and discusses certain disclo* J.D. 1984, St. John's University School of Law. Anne Y. Shields, Esq., is associated with the law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom in New York, New
York. She is a Member of the CJRA Advisory Group for the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York.
1 Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. 1992).
2 Id. § 478. The chief judge of each district court designates a reporter for each
group. Id.
3 Id. § 473. The advisory group shall consider and may include in the plan the
differential treatment of civil cases, early and continuous control of the pretrial process by a judicial officer, encouragement of cost-effective discovery, and authorization
to use alternate dispute resolution programs. Id.
4 Id. § 473(a)(4).
5 Id.

6 The term "disclosure" is used to describe the voluntary exchange of information
without the making of a discovery request pursuant to Rule 26(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a). Rule 26 discovery methods include: deposi-
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sure procedures currently in effect, as well as amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Federal Rules"). Finally, this
Article addresses the efficacy of the automatic disclosure procedure and concludes that, while the proposed system may be valuable in reducing the disposition time of simple cases, disclosure
fails to treat the perceived greater abuses of the discovery process.
I.

STATISTICAL INFORMATION

It is difficult to pinpoint the amount of time necessary to complete the discovery process in the typical civil case. One way to
attempt to capture this information is to compare statistics indicating the average time to dispose of a case involving no pretrial
activity with statistics indicating the average time to dispose of a
case in which some or all pretrial activity has occurred. Presumably, the time difference between these two categories of cases indicates the amount of time the parties engage in pretrial discovery.
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts publishes statistics indicating the amount of time it takes for each
district court to dispose of its cases. By comparing cases in the
two categories described above, the Administrative Office determined that the national average time in which parties were engaged in pretrial discovery during the twelve month period ending
June 30, 1990 was seven months.7 The average time in federal
district courts in the State of New York compared favorably with
the national average. In the same year, parties litigating in the
Eastern District of New York spent an average of nine months
engaged in the pretrial discovery process, while in the Southern

tions written interrogatories; and requests for production of documents or things permission to enter upon land or property for investigative purposes, physical, and
mental examinations and for admissions. See id.; see also infra notes 22-24, 30-51 and
accompanying text (discussing various forms of disclosure).
7 See 1992 DIR. OF THE ADMiN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. Crs. ANN.REP. app. 1, tbl. C-5

[hereinafter ANN.REP.] (indicating average time from filing to disposition of cases
filed in district courts). According to this report, the average time to dispose of a case
in which the parties conducted all or "some" pretrial activity was fourteen months.
Id. The average time period between filing and disposition of a case in which there
had been no pretrial activity was seven months. Id. The difference between these two

periods of time reflects an average pretrial discovery period of seven months. Id.
These statistics include cases involving all areas of federal jurisdiction. Id. The report does not distinguish cases in which some, as opposed to all, of the pretrial discovery process has been completed.
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District of New York, the average time to complete discovery was
twelve months."
When numbers alone are considered, the pretrial discovery
process does not seem fraught with delay and thus, one might assume that there is little dissatisfaction among attorneys and litigants. Although the numbers fail to communicate dissatisfaction
with the discovery process, surveys of attorneys and judicial officers paint a different picture. 9
In a 1989 survey conducted by Louis Harris and Associates,
Inc. (the "Harris Survey"), 900 attorneys and 147 federal district
court judges were polled to determine perceptions of the high costs
and unnecessary delays attendant to federal civil litigation.10 Respondents were also asked to comment as to particular procedural
reforms.
The Harris Survey indicates that attorneys and judges overwhelmingly identify discovery abuse as the single most important
cause of high costs and delay in federal civil litigation. Sixty-two
percent of private litigators, including both plaintiff and defense
bars, identified abuse of the discovery process as a "major cause"
of excessive costs and delays." Seventy-one percent of federal
judges agreed.' 2 The highest degree of consensus came from the
corporate counsel interviewed, eighty percent of whom agreed3
that discovery abuse is a "major cause" of expense and delay.'
This high percentage is not surprising given the fact that corporate counsel are closest to the individual most affected by discovery abuses-the client.
When asked to identify the aspects of the discovery process
that are responsible for the perceived abuse, respondents most
often pointed to attorneys who "over-discover" cases by failing to
focus on issues involved.' 4 Respondents also blamed attorneys
who request information that is immaterial to the subject matter

8 See id.
9 See infra notes 10-17 and accompanying text (discussing survey which illustrates high level of dissatisfaction with discovery process).
10 Louis HARRIS

& Assocs.,

INC., PROCEDURAL REFORMI OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYS-

TEM, Mar. 1989 [hereinafter HAIus
11 Id. at 20.
12 Id.
13 Id.

14 Id. at 23.

SuRvY].
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of the case. 1" Smaller percentages of respondents blamed attor16
neys who refused to produce discoverable information.
The results of the Harris Survey indicate that dissatisfaction
with the discovery process is as widespread today as in 1983 when
reforms to the discovery rules were enacted in an effort to curb
abuses associated with unnecessary expense and delay.1 7 Thus, it
appears that prior reforms to the Federal Rules, including the introduction of a balancing concept between relevance and burden
into the definition of what is "discoverable" and the imposition of
sanctions for discovery abuses, have had little effect in curbing the
undue expense and delay associated with the discovery process.',
Faced with the continuing failure of the current discovery system to lead to "the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action," 19 courts have begun experimenting with disclosure
as a new tool to reform the discovery process.
II.

DISCLOSURE DEFINED

Simply stated, the term disclosure is used to refer to the voluntary exchange of documentary evidence without the necessity of
making a formal request. In its broadest sense, the process of disclosure would completely supplant the discovery process in its
present form. 20 As proposed by Judge Schwarzer, this is achieved
15 HARRIS SURVEY, supra note 10, at 23-24.
16 Id. at 24. Between 59% and 86% of respondents blamed "over-discovery" as a

"major cause" of undue expense and delay associated with the discovery process. Percentages of those identifying the withholding of discoverable information as a "major

cause" of undue expense and delay ranged between 21% and 48%. Interestingly, 59%
of respondents practicing in small plaintiffs' firms perceived the withholding of discoverable information as a major cause of expense and delay, while only 30% of respondents practicing in large defense firms pointed to this factor. Id. This can probably be explained by the fact that, in most cases, it is the large defense firm that

represents the entity in possession of the greatest volume of documents. Id.
17 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 16, 26(b)(1)(g); see also Peter M. Fishbein, New Federal
Rule 26: A Litigator'sPerspective, 57 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 739, 739 (1983). For example,
Rule 26 was amended to deal with the broadness of the discovery rules that had led to

situations in which even legitimate discovery requests had become wasteful and expensive. Id.

The revised rule called for a cost analysis and permitted the court to

limit or prohibit discovery under appropriate circumstances. Id. at 743.
18 See American Law Institute Study on Paths to a "BetterWay":"Litigation,Alternatives and Accommodation: Steering Committee Report, 1989 DUKE L.J. 811, 818

(1989) (noting that while pretrial discovery has been extensively studied and related
rules amended several times, abuse and discontent remain high).
19 See FED. R. Crv. P. 1.
20 William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. PiTr. L. REV. 703, 721 (1989).
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by shifting the focus of the rules from "discovery-the process-to
disclosure-the objective." 2 1 This concept is referred to herein as

"general disclosure." Disclosure is also used to refer to the early
exchange of information prior to embarking on the traditional discovery process. This concept is referred to herein as "limited
disclosure."
A

General Disclosure

The concept of "general disclosure" envisions a rule requiring
early and continual disclosure of documents and information by
all parties. 22 The materials to be disclosed include documents in
existence, such as those currently produced in response to document requests, as well as written responses yet to be created, similar to those currently provided in response to interrogatories.
The information to be voluntarily produced is defined as all
documents and information "material to any claim or defense in
the action, together with the names and addresses of all persons
reasonably believed to have information material to the action."23
Judge Schwarzer also recommended that litigants submit "statements informing the opposing party of the material information
possessed by persons under its control, such as the individual parties and their managing agents."2 4 The duty to disclose would be
ongoing and failure to disclose could result in the imposition of
sanctions.
Under Judge Schwarzer's model, conflicts among the parties
as to the proper scope of disclosure are to be resolved judicially by
21 Id.
22 See id. at

722-23.
Id. at 721. The term "material" includes information that "may have a bearing
on the outcome of the action." William W. Schwarzer, Slaying the Monsters of Cost
23

and Delay: Would DisclosureBe More Effective Than Discovery? 74

JUDIcATURE

181

(1991). Material information also includes information "that would be helpful to the
opponent." Id. It does not include however, matter that is to be used solely for impeachment purposes. Id. These materiality standards are meant to be more stringent
than the current "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence" standard. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The limited scope of materiality is tied
to the notion that parties may not use the disclosure process to develop their claims;
instead, parties have a duty to investigate prior to commencing an action. See
Schwarzer, supra, at 181.
24 Schwarzer, supra note 23, at 180. At the time of filing the complaint, the plaintiff would be required to disclose and the defendant would be required to answer or
move on the merits. Id.
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making a "motion to clarify." 25 For example, if a defendant in a
drug products liability action believes that only a certain formulation or strength of the drug is relevant, that party would argue for
production of information regarding only the formula or dose at
issue. The plaintiff, on the other hand, might contend that all formulations are potentially relevant. In such a case, counsel might
file a motion to clarify the extent of defendant's disclosure
obligations.
Judge Schwarzer's proposed system of general disclosure allows the parties to resort to traditional discovery methods only
upon court order granted after making a motion that clearly demonstrates the need for additional information.26 According to
Judge Schwarzer, such a motion might be granted when documents known to be in existence have not been produced or when a
conflict arises that requires explanation.2 7 Leave to take traditional discovery would also be granted in complex cases which require depositions to explain proposed testimony or depositions of
expert witnesses.28
B.

Limited Disclosure

The concept of limited disclosure contemplates the imposition
upon all parties of a duty to disclose information prior to embarking upon traditional discovery methods. Such limited disclosure
provisions are already in effect in certain federal district courts,2 9
and advisory groups appointed pursuant to the CJRA have been
encouraged to incorporate such provisions into their expense and
delay reduction plans.3 0 The recently approved amendments to

25 Schwarzer, supra note 23, at 181. The judge would then decide the motion on a
case-by-case basis, rather than on theoretical principles as is the current practice. Id.
26 See Schwarzer, supra note 23, at 181 ("No discovery would be permitted
against an adverse party until after full disclosure has been made, and then only by
order of the court on a showing of a particularized need.").
27 Schwarzer, supra note 23, at 181-82.
28 Schwarzer, supra note 23, at 182.
29 See, e.g., infra note 32 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
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the Federal Rules3312 similarly embrace this concept of disclosure
prior to discovery.
Local court rules in the Southern District of Florida and the
Central District of California require counsel to schedule an "early
meeting" for the purpose of, inter alia, exchanging certain enumerated documents and lists of witnesses.3 3 Specifically, counsel
are to exchange all documents "reasonably available to a party
which are then contemplated to be used in support of the allegations of the pleading filed by the party."3 4 Parties are also required to exchange "any other evidence then reasonably available
...to

obviate the filing of unnecessary discovery motions."35

The Litigation Section of the American Bar Association (the
"ABA") recommended that advisory groups appointed pursuant to
the CJRA incorporate a form of automatic disclosure into their
plans. Although the ABA rejected the adoption of a system of general disclosure, it recommended that parties automatically produce a list of names of persons whom they intend to call at trial,
along with a brief summary of their testimony.3 6 Further, the
ABA suggested that parties provide a list of exhibits the party intends to introduce at trial, including those used to support claims
for damages. 3 7 Under the ABA model, defendants would be re31 See Randall Samborn, New Discovery Rules Take Effect, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 6,
1993, at 3 (reporting passing of expiration date for Congressional nullification of Federal Rules drafted by Supreme Court). See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074 (1988 &
Supp. 1992) (authorizing Supreme Court to prescribe rules of civil procedure, which
become effective unless Congress acts otherwise).
32 See FED. R. Crv. P. 26 advisory committee note, reprinted in 113 S.Ct. orders
609, 701-02 ("Through the addition of [Rule 26(a),] paragraphs (1)-(4), this subdivision
imposes on parties a duty to disclose, without awaiting formal discovery requests,
certain basic information that is needed in most cases to prepare for trial or make an
informed decision about settlement."). The rule is proposed to "accelerate the exchange of basic information... and eliminate the paperwork involved in requesting
such information." Id.
33 See C.D. CAL. R. 6.1; S.D. FLA. R. 16.1(B).
34 S.D. FLA. R. 16.1(A)(1). The same language appears in the court rules for the
Central District of California. See C.D. CAL. R. 6.1.1.
35 See C.D. CAL. R. 6.1.3; S.D. FLA. R. 16.1(B)(3). Furthermore, parties must exchange lists of those witnesses -withknowledge of facts that support material allegations and remain bound by a continuing duty to make known new witnesses involved
in the litigation. See C.D. CAL.R. 6.1.4; S.D. FA. R. 16.1(B)(4).
36 MODEL LOCAL RULES FOR UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURTS

TO IMPLEMENT THE

ACT OF 1990 Part II (VII)(a)(4), (b)(4) (A.B.A. Litig. Sect. 1991)
[hereinafter ABA Rules].
37 See id. at Part H (VII)(a)(5), (b)(5). Individual judges often require witness and
exhibit lists, such as those suggested to be mandatorily provided, to be produced as
part of the parties' pretrial discovery order. Id.
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORMi
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quired to produce a statement of whether plaintiffs claims would
be covered by insurance and if so, the amount and nature of the
insurance.38 As noted, the ABA specifically rejected the notion
that disclosure replace discovery. Rather, like the local court
rules referred to above, the ABA envisions disclosure as merely a
first step in the discovery process.3 9
The amendments to the Federal Rules impose a duty to disclose similar to that of the court rules in effect in the Southern
District of Florida and the Central District of California. 40 Rule
264" requires each party to provide to every other party "the name
and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information relevant to disputed
facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings, identifying the
subjects of the information."42 Individuals possessing discoverable information have been defined as those who would likely be
deposed or called as a witness by any party, but do not include
each and every individual with any information whatsoever about
the litigation. 43 Identification of the subjects of witnesses' information envisions the exchange of a brief outline of the topics about
which each individual will testify. 44
Rule 26 also requires parties to provide copies, or a description, of all documents and "tangible things" in the possession of
the party "that are relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings." 45 The language "relevant to disputed

facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings" replaced the
38 Id. at Part II (VII)(b)(8).
39 See id. at Part II (VII) note ("We do not believe that 'disclosure' is the answer to
discovery delay and abuse because it adds a further layer of complexity and uncertainty to the subject.").
40 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (discussing local court rules).
41 FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (effective Dec. 1, 1993).
42 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A) (effective Dec. 1, 1993). The amended Rules also
require disclosure of expert witness testimony and pretrial disclosure of witnesses
and exhibits. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2), (3) (effective Dec. 1, 1993). The timing of
disclosure of this information is tied into the date of trial rather than to the early
stages of the litigation. See id.
43 See Proposed Rule 26(a)(1)(A) 1991 advisory committee note, reprinted in 112
S. Ct. orders 280, 306.
44 See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a) advisory committee notes, reprinted in 113 S. Ct. orders 609, 704.
45 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (effective Dec. 1, 1993); see FED. R. Civ. P. 26, advisory committee note, reprinted in 113 S.Ct. orders 609, 704; ("Subparagraph (B) is
included as a substitute for the inquiries routinely made about the existence and location of documents and other tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of
the disclosing party.").
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phrase "bears significantly on any claim or defense," which was
contained in an earlier version of the proposed rules.4 6 While arguably neither phrase would dissuade a crafty litigator from abusing the disclosure process, as routinely occurs, the advisory committee admonishes litigators to forego "indulg[ing] in
gamesmanship with respect to the disclosure obligations."4 7 The
committee contemplates that the issues which would be the subject of disclosure would be "informally refined and clarified" in
keeping with "common sense ...[and] the salutary purposes [of]
the rule."48 The amended Rules also require the parties to provide
a computation of any damages claimed 49 and to produce or make
available for inspection and copying all documents upon which
that computation is based.5 0 Finally, parties must produce or
make available any insurance agreement under which an insurer
may be liable to satisfy all or part of any judgment that may be
rendered in the case. 5 '
Rule 26 further requires that the enumerated disclosures be
made early in the litigation 52 and prohibits a party from avoiding
disclosure on the grounds that it has not fully completed its investigation of the case or because it challenges the sufficiency of another party's disclosure.
Like the local rules referred to above, the amended Rules allow the parties access to traditional discovery methods without
the necessity of a court order. Such discovery is not unlimited,
however, in that the amended Rules restrict the number of deposi46 Compare FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (effective Dec. 1, 1993) with Proposed Rule
26(a)(1)(B), reprinted in 112 S. Ct. orders 280, 294.
47 FED. R. Cirv. P. 26 advisory committee notes, reprintedin 113 S. Ct. orders 609,
705.

48

Id.

R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(C) (effective Dec. 1, 1993).
50 Id.
51 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(D) (effective Dec. 1, 1993) (replacing Rule 26(b)(2); providing for discoverability of insurance agreements). The prior rule specifically stated
that such production does not render the insurance agreements admissible at trial.
See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(2) (superseded Dec. 1, 1993). The omission of this specific
language does not change the rule on admissibility. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(a)(1)(D)
advisory committee notes, reprinted in 113 S. Ct. orders 609, 706.
(effective Dec. 1, 1993). The amended rules man52 See FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(a)(1), (f)
date that the parties meet "as soon as practicable and in any event at least 14 days
before a [Rule 16] scheduling conference" to discuss, inter alia, the requisite Rule 26
disclosures. FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(f) (effective Dec. 1, 1993). Disclosure should be made at
this meeting or within 10 days thereafter. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a)(1) (effective Dec. 1,
1993).
49 FED.
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tions and interrogatories that may be used.53 Specifically, Rule
33(a) limits the number of interrogatories that may be served to
twenty-five per side, including subparts.- 4 Rule 31(a)(2)(A) limits
each side in the litigation to the taking often depositions.5 5 These
limits are presumptive
only and may be exceeded pursuant to
6
5
court order.

III.

Is DISCLOSURE THE ANSwER?

Commentators propose that a system of general disclosure
would benefit counsel, the parties, and the court by requiring production of the same evidence discoverable under the previous
rules without the expense and delay generated by the current
practices used to obtain information.57 Commentators also claim
that judicial involvement would be more focused than under the
present system of discovery.5 8 It is argued that a motion for clarification would, for example, involve the judicial officer in a more
meaningful way than that afforded by the current Rule 16 scheduling conference, which often takes place with the judicial officer
knowing little or nothing about the facts of the case.59
A.

The Utility of Disclosure in Cases Requiring Access to
TraditionalDiscovery Methods

The availability of, or necessity for, a motion to clarify as well
as continuing access to traditional discovery, albeit by court order
only, subjects the amended system of general disclosure to the
same pitfalls associated with the current discovery process. Since
discovery would almost always be necessary in complex litiga53 See FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a) (effective Dec. 1, 1993) (limiting interrogatories); FED.

R. Crv. P. 30(a)(2)(A) (effective Dec. 1, 1993) (limiting depositions). Some groups, citing the need for litigants of lesser means to rely upon written discovery rather than
more costly depositions, resist placing limitations on the number of interrogatories
that may be propounded. See, e.g., ADVISORY GROUP, UNITED STATES DisTRIr COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, FINAL REPORT, 142 F.R.D. 185, 219 (1991)
(noting opposition of earlier advisory committee to presumptive limits).
54 See FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a) (effective Dec. 1, 1993).
55 See FED. R. Civ. P. 31(a)(2)(A) (effective Dec. 1, 1993).
56 See id. ("A party must obtain leave of court... [if] a proposed deposition would
result in more than ten depositions being taken.... ."); FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a) (effective
Dec. 1, 1993).
57 See Schwarzer, supra note 23, at 182.
58 Schwarzer, supra note 23, at 182 ("The disclosure system will involve the judge
in the management of cases.").
59 See Schwarzer, supra note 23, at 182.
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tion, 60 the general disclosure system would do nothing more than

add an extra layer of expense and delay. Similarly, models incorporating both disclosure and free access to traditional discovery do
little to curtail the problems of over-discovery and the withholding
of discoverable or "disclosable" information in all but the simplest
of cases. Using the drug product liability lawsuit hypothesized
above as a model, little difference can be observed among the
systems.
As noted, the defendant manufacturer in such a case might,
under the general disclosure system, make a motion to clarify in
order to shield what the defense believes are irrelevant documents
about differing formulations of the drug at issue. Under the limited disclosure system, a plaintiff faced with what is believed to be
inadequate disclosure would make a motion to compel. Under the
previous system, the defendant would object to a written request
for production as irrelevant to the issues raised. Either the plaintiff would concede, or the court, as in the limited disclosure situation, would be faced with a motion to compel or a motion for a
protective order.
In the latter two cases, the issues would be as focused, and
the court as informed, as in the case of the proposed motion to
clarify. Since the motion to clarify seems more akin to current
motions to compel or for protection, it does not seem fair to point
to the benefits of disclosure by comparing a motion to clarify to a
Rule 16 conference.
In terms of judicial involvement, the only difference between
the systems is a slight alteration in timing and the generation of
papers in the form of a discovery request and responding objection. It is submitted that the making of, and objecting to, such a
request is fairly routine and does not generate a great deal of expense and delay. Moreover, a written document request may, in
some cases, be easier for a responding party to interpret than the
vague language of rules requiring disclosure of all information
that is "material" or "likely to bear significantly" on claims or
defenses. 6 '
60 The term "complex" as used herein is not limited to those cases that may be
litigated pursuant to the rules set forth in the Manual for Complex Litigation. See
MANUAL FOR CoMPLEx LITIGATION, SECOND § 33 (1985). Included in the definition are
those cases in which the parties would participate or seek leave to participate in
traditional discovery after complying with initial disclosure requirements.
61 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (comparing final Rule 26(a)(1)(B)
with earlier version).
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Nor can the disclosure system be justified on the notion that it
necessarily fosters greater cooperation among counsel. While little research exists concerning the efficacy of mandatory disclosure
rules, the results of one commentator's limited survey indicate
that the rules work when attorneys are willing to cooperate. 2 In
cases where counsel are not anxious to comply, the rules are read
technically, and information may be withheld.63 Such compliance,
like an overly technical reading of discovery requests, leads to the
necessity for judicial involvement via motions to compel. Such
compliance also defeats one of the purposes of the disclosure rules
64
by forcing the parties to resort to traditional discovery methods.
Although it has been suggested that counsel interpreting disclosure requirements should view themselves as "officers of the
court rather than partisan advocates,"6 5 it is submitted that attor-

neys are not likely to interpret the terms of disclosure any more
broadly or fairly to their adversary's interests than they would be
to interpret a traditional document request.
Litigators know that the vast majority of cases settle prior to
trial, and the pretrial disclosure of information can greatly impact
the settlement value of a case.66 Given this fact, attorneys will
likely continue to act in their client's best interest and interpret
rules as narrowly as possible within the bounds of the law. There
is simply no reason to believe that attorneys will act as unbiased
officers of the court-in effect judicial officers-during the pretrial
phase of litigation and then suddenly revert to acting as partisan
advocates during trial. Whatever the system, parties will not be
more willing to produce potentially damaging documents and will
refuse to do so in the absence of a court order-whether rendered
in the context of a motion to clarify, to compel, or for protection.
If disclosure will not cause counsel to change current practices aimed at what counsel believe is a good faith effort to shield
unfavorable evidence from discovery, it does not seem that there is
any way around the notion that only "judges can save lawyers
62 See Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery
and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795, 817 (1991).
63 Id. at 816-17.
64 See id. at 822.
65 Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Characterof Civil Discovery: A Critique and
Proposalsfor Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1296, 1349-50 (1978) ("[Clounsel should be
commanded by new ethical directives and civil rules to search diligently for all data
that might help resolve disputes fairly and to share voluntarily the results of their
searches with both the court and the other parties to the action.").
66 See Schwarzer, supra note 23, at 179.
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from themselves."6 7 Put simply, there is no substitute for active
judicial involvement, either from the district court judge handling
the case or from the magistrate judge assigned to handle the pretrial phase of litigation. Lawyers cannot be expected to play the
part of impartial arbiter when litigating in the pretrial phase.68
The fact that district judges may be too busy to handle pretrial discovery matters or that magistrate judges do not have the
prestige to ensure enforcement of their orders should not cause
lawyers to abandon their roles as advocates. Certainly, district
court judges are overburdened, especially by a growing criminal
calendar. 69 If this is the case, however, judges must delegate responsibility to less burdened magistrate judges and make it clear
to the parties that the district court stands behind the orders of
the magistrate judge. In such a case, counsel would certainly adhere to the rulings of the magistrate judge, and pretrial discovery
would proceed without the necessity of waiting for a ruling of an
overburdened district court judge.
B.

The Utility of Disclosure in Simple Cases

Proponents of disclosure argue that, in many cases,
mandatory disclosure would comprise all of the discovery that is
necessary to prepare a case for trial.7 0 If this could be accomplished, then disclosure would be truly helpful in that the pretrial
process would impose no burden on the courts and the parties
would amicably go about their business of producing all necessary
information prior to trial without conflict. As demonstrated
above, however, it is unrealistic to think that parties will behave
any differently under a system of disclosure than under the present system of discovery. This, however, is not reason enough to
discard the disclosure notion completely.
In simple cases, the process of disclosure may well achieve the
goals of cutting down on undue expense and delay. Specifically, a
system of disclosure may institutionalize the cooperation that currently exists among many lawyers litigating simple cases. For ex67 Schwarzer, supra note 23, at 179. Some advocates of change believe that judges
should "exercise more effective supervision and control." Id.
68 Schwarzer, supra note 23, at 179-80.
69 See, e.g., ADvISORY GROUP, UNITED STATES DIsTRIuc COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF NEW YomR, FINAL REPORT, 142 F.R.D. 185, 204 (1991) (discussing effects
of criminal docket on civil justice system).
70 See Schwarzer, supra note 23, at 182 ("If the disclosure system operates properly there should be few motions for discovery.").
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ample, a negligence case involving a nonpermanent, nonserious
injury may be currently litigated by making a formal or informal
request for medical records or authorization to obtain the same.
After production of such records, the parties may agree to a fair
settlement and the case will have been disposed of with no judicial
intervention.
If this case were litigated under the disclosure system, the
parties' actions and the outcome would be no different, except that
the parties would be obligated to act as cooperative attorneys
would in the normal course. By requiring early production by less
than cooperative attorneys, the disclosure system may, indeed,
foster a quicker and less expensive road to disposition of a simple
case.
C. The Utility of Limited Disclosure
While limited disclosure does not seem to be the answer to all
of the evils of the discovery process, there are reasons to consider
implementation of such a rule. 71 Limited disclosure can accomplish the elimination of a "first wave" of discovery requests. 7 2 This
eliminates the expense of drafting and objecting to such requests
as well as the delay attendant thereto.
Limited disclosure can also eliminate squabbles over the discoverability of certain documents that are clearly within the scope
of permissible discovery such as contracts or other documents
used to prepare the pleadings. 73 As a first step in litigation, limited disclosure may result in the parties' early focus on the issues
of the case and what discovery will be necessary to prepare the
case for trial. In order to avoid the pitfalls referred to above, however, it is advisable to limit the subjects of early disclosure to
clearly identifiable information. Such information might include
insurance documentation, medical authorizations, materials used
to calculate damages, and, in the case of corporate parties, the
identification of individuals most knowledgeable about the issues
in the case. The early production of such easily identifiable information is preferable to requiring the early production of all that is
"material" or "likely to bear" on claims and defenses. As noted,
the interpretation of these terms can result in satellite litigation
71 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
73 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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and may result in more delay than is currently associated with the
pretrial process.
CONCLUSION

If the concept of automatic disclosure, or any procedural reform, is to remedy abuses in the discovery process, it must address
the abuses most commonly identified. As noted, the broadest use
of the disclosure process would seem to create its own set of
problems that are similar to those already faced by counsel and
litigants. Limited disclosure can be effective in that it requires an
early focus on issues. Further, if the subjects of disclosure are limited and clearly stated, limited disclosure can be an effective case
management tool. In simple cases, disclosure may indeed accomplish the goal of replacing discovery and lead to an earlier and less
expensive disposition of the case.
Replacing discovery with disclosure does not, however, address the perceived greater abuses of the discovery process. Disclosure, whether limited or general, is merely a first step in the
discovery process. Thus, the problem of "over-discovery" persists.
Over-discovery tactics may be contained by placing limits on
certain tools of discovery, such as limiting the number of interrogatories, document requests and the length and number of depositions. Arbitrary limitations, though embraced by the recent
amendments to the Federal Rules, 74 are resisted by many who believe that abuses can be handled by a competent judiciary on a
case-by-case basis. This opinion goes to the heart of the matter.
Any program of discovery reform must include tight control by a
judicial officer. When this ingredient is added to the mix, all aspects of discovery abuse are affected. With effective judicial control, compliance with deadlines can be monitored, speedy rulings
as to the permissible scope of discovery may be obtained, and overdiscovery will not be tolerated.
While automatic disclosure of basic information will certainly
change and, in all probability, improve the discovery process, it is
not a panacea. Reform programs should begin with disclosure and
experiment with additional procedures such as limiting the use of
discovery tools. Most importantly, however, an informed judicial
74 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text (discussing fixed limits on
number of interrogatories and depositions).
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officer must preside over the process to ensure full disclosure of
discoverable information without abuse.

